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The urban development process today is typically characterized by intense study and discussion of a
project's impact upon various aspects of society. In this article, the author chronicles the rise of the major
actors involved in the urban development scene: developers, municipalities, and citizens. The actor's power
bases and modes of interaction are sketched to illustrate their effect on the urban development process.
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Introduction
Once merely a matter of getting zone changes and
abiding by a few basic rules, governmental approval
of development has become a complicated game of
bargaining in which cities and neighborhood groups
have become "civic entrepreneurs," and developers,
as Donald G. Hagman put it shortly before his
death, have become "community financiers." 1
This method of development is radically different
from past methods — indeed, the opposite of tradi-
tional zoning practice — in that it is often project-
specific and less bound by legal constraints than
traditional land-use regulation. 2 As a result, the out-
comes for both the developer and the community
have become less predictable.
This bargaining process has come about as a result
of a variety of pressures placed on the land-use regu-
lation system over the past twenty or so years. But
all these pressures are traceable to three related
developments:
(1) A growing understanding that development
has external effects and, largely through the en-
vironmental impact process, a growing ability to
identify, measure and deal with those effects on a
case-by-case basis.
(2) The rise of what might be called "citizen
power"— environmental, consumer, and neighbor-
hood groups which have forced the creation of such
tools as the environmental impact statement and
have subsequently used them to wield great power
over development, even when the groups are small
and have relatively little money. The undeniable suc-
cess of citizen power has brought citizen groups to
the bargaining table and made developers (and
cities) more willing to deal with them.
(3) The growing reluctance of political jurisdic-
tions to shoulder the external costs of private devel-
opment, leading them to push the burden onto the
developer. This practice has been far more common
in developing suburban communities than in the
older cities, and in California its growth has been
greatly hastened along by the passage of Proposition
13.
But how have these three trends converged to cre-
ate today's atmosphere of bargaining? Would certain
basic ground rules or procedures help make the
development process more predictable for the devel-
oper and still achieve the goals of the communities
and citizens groups that engage in bargaining these
days? To begin to find the answers to these questions,
we must examine how bargaining over land use has
evolved in the United States over the past sixty years.
The Inflexibility of Traditional American Zoning
Terms like "bargaining" and "flexibility" have been
dirty words since the beginning of land use regula-
tion in America. In fact, zoning was introduced to
reduce flexibility and protect property owners in
high-class commercial areas and affluent neighbor-
hoods from the encroachment of undesirable land
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uses. 3 Because the courts concluded that zoning was
derived from the police power of the state, it could
not be applied arbitrarily, and uniformity in its
application — subjecting all property owners in a
particular zone to the same standards- was needed
to resist legal attacks on grounds that the municipal-
ity was arbitrarily contracting away its police
power. 4 Good-government reformers also wanted to
eliminate flexibility in zoning to discourage corrup-
tion—a fear that proved justified over the years. 5
From the beginning, of course, flexibility did exist
in zoning, and was used — often by affluent subur-
ban enclaves to keep out undesirable additions to
their communities, and often by corrupt urban poli-
ticians to reward their friends and supporters. The
variance was suggested by the federal 1923 Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act, which intended it to be
used in hardship cases. But in practice, according
to Richard Babcock, it was used "to grant and deny
favors" to particular developers. 6 After World War
II, the special permit was added to many zoning sys-
tems, and many communities took advantage of this
additional discretion by using it to keep out such
"undesirable" uses as motels and glue works. This
widespread misuse of the special permit prompted
one prominent planning lawyer, Walter Blucher, to
ask in the '50s whether zoning was "increasingly
becoming the rule of man rather than the rule of
law." 7
Despite the successful use of variances and special
permits for exclusionary or corrupt purposes, the
zoning system remained in principle an inflexible
guide to development, designed to encourage good
city planning through general land use decisions
made in advance and discourage local officials from
assessing development projects on a case-by-case
basis. According to Professor Jan Z. Krasnowiecki,
this method of zoning, which began with the federal
enabling legislation of the '20s, left "a legacy of rigid-
ity: a system designed to prevent change rather than
to encourage it -a static, end-state concept of land
use control."8
The Will to Bargain: Citizens
With the exception of the wealthy and powerful
residents of exclusive suburban communities and the
organized downtown business interests that domi-
nated local politics in most communities, up until
i the 1960s citizen groups had little direct effect on
a community's development decisions. In the '60s,
however, the growth of the modern environmental
movement helped lay the groundwork for two im-
portant developments that led to the bargaining pro-
cess we see today: the willingness to deal with
project-specific effects of development, and the rise
of citizen groups powerful enough to take a seat at
the bargaining table.
'There is a new mood in America," the Rockefeller
Brothers Fund Task Force on Land Use and Urban
Growth reported in 1973:
Increasingly, citizens are asking what urban
growth will add to the quality of their lives.
They are questioning the way relatively un-
constrained, piecemeal urbanization is chang-
ing their communities and are rebelling against
the traditional processes of government and
the marketplace which, they believe, have in-
adequately guided development in the past.
They are measuring new development propo-
sals by the extent to which environmental cri-
teria are satisfied — by what new housing or
business will generate in terms of additional
traffic
,
pollution of air and water, erosion, and
scenic disturbance. 9
The environmentalists of the late '60s were re-
markably successful in a short period of time, per-
haps because development of all kinds was coming
so quickly. In questioning the true cost of growth
for the first time, the new environmental movement
was able to force passage of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 and, subsequently, similar
laws at the state and local levels. "Arming themselves
with technical experts, citizens used public hearings,
the media, and the courts to exert pressure on gov-
ernment to deny approvals for controversial proj-
ects," wrote planning consultant Malcolm Rivkin. 10
Almost overnight, groups of ordinary citizens ac-
quired power to stop developments cold.
Just as important, however, was the fact that the
new environmental laws acknowledged that each
land-use case is different because each development
project's "external effects"— its impact on neighbors
and on the municipality in which it is located — are
different. The environmental impact statement was
the crucial tool in this regard. Unlike zoning, it was
not a set of development limitations intended to en-
sure that all pieces of property dedicated to similar
uses were treated the same. Quite the opposite — it
was a procedure, designed to assure that each piece
of land's differences were taken into account. The
environmental impact process lends itself to discre-
tion and performance standards. The EIS, Malcolm
Rivkin wrote,
zoning history
misuse or power
true growth costs
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acquiring influence
controlling sprawl
forces the developer to think through the im-
pact of a project on natural conditions and
community patterns, to pay explicit attention
to alternative solutions, and to evaluate meth-
ods to mitigate adverse consequences. The
public can comment— and does. The reviewer,
lacking prescribed standards against which to
measure much of the information submitted,
can exercise considerable discretion reaching
final judgments and setting performance stan-
dards (e.g., protecting water supply and sensi-
tive land and water features, or preventing a
drain on community services). Options and
modifications are possible on matters ranging
from density to storm-water management.
Thus, the EIS can provide a legitimate frame-
work for discussion, for establishing trade-offs
and conditions — in short, for negotiation. 11
Environmentalists were not the only citizens gain-
ing power in the '60s and early 70s. Poor urban resi-
dents, feeling threatened by larger forces in society,
flexed their muscles too, gaining power and respect
and, hence, a place at the bargaining table.
Perhaps the seminal figure in this drive to organize
the urban poor was Saul Alinsky, a blunt-spoken
organizer from Chicago who gained wide acclaim
for spearheading The Woodlawn Organization's
successful stand against the University of Chicago's
expansion plans in 1960, and who subsequently
trained a whole new generation of organizers
through his Industrial Areas Foundation. 12 While
Alinsky was showing slum neighborhoods the nuts-
and-bolts of how to gain power through confronta-
tion, the federal urban renewal program of the '50s
and '60s tore their neighborhoods apart, giving them
urgent reason to organize. Later, a wave of federal
programs — most notably Community Action and
Model Cities — were structured to require more citi-
zen participation, thus encouraging the urban poor
to acquire more power. 13
The environmentalists and the urban organizers
were part of a larger trend toward the successful use
of citizen power against society's large institutions,
public and private. Both the environmental move-
ment and the rise of urban activists forced onto the
land-use agenda the social and environmental costs
of development that zoning has never addressed,
and both used conflict and confrontation to acquire
enough power to sit at the bargaining table.
The Will to Bargain: Municipalities
While the "country" and the "city" were awaken-
ing, the suburbs — where local jurisdictions have tra-
ditionally been the most effective controllers of land
use — also were coming to see that development
exacted a cost traditional zoning did not begin to
address. Whereas the EIS addressed the environmen-
tal and social costs of new development, suburban
communities began to feel the fiscal cost of sprawl.
In the late '60s and early 70s, the suburbs were
continuing to grow at an almost frightening pace.
In fact, 1973 was the high-water mark in American
history for housing starts. 14 Many planners of the
time sought to eliminate sprawl through such meth-
ods as planned unit and clustered development. 15
In addition, a large number of suburban communi-
ties began trying to guide, control, or simply limit
growth by setting up growth quotas, rating systems
for potential developments, or restrictions on de-
velopment according to the availability of such
public services as water and sewer lines. 16
Most communities, however, just wanted to make
sure the cost of capital improvements made neces-
sary by sprawl got passed on to somebody else —
namely, the new residents. Through their subdivi-
sion regulations, suburban municipalities began re-
quiring the developer or the new residents to pick
up the cost of such necessary improvements as
roads, water and sewer lines, drainage ways, and
street lights. In some cases developers would be re-
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quired to build and dedicate these facilities to the
municipality; in other cases, special assessment dis-
tricts were created to shield other residents from the
taxes needed to provide them. 17
In the '60s, as growth became more rapid, many
communities began requiring that new develop-
ments set aside land or in lieu fees for parks and
schools. 18
By 1970, this system of capital financing had been
refined further, and suburbs had begun requiring
"impact" or "development fees." These fees, based on
the number of bedrooms or homes in a develop-
ment, were used not only to provide services directly
to the new subdivision, but also to provide for ser-
vices outside the development which needed expan-
sion because of the new residents. 19 Many states
passed enabling legislation to authorize local govern-
ments to assess such fees. 20
Impact fees were treated roughly in the courts at
first— developers attacked them as being disguised
taxes, takings, and unauthorized uses of police
power. 21 Although courts still are not entirely in
agreement on the matter of impact fees, a growing
number of judicial decisions are upholding their
validity so long as there is a "rational nexus"— a rea-
sonably close relationship — between the develop-
ment in question and the use of the fees. 22
Suburban impact fees and exactions have contrib-
uted to an atmosphere conducive to bargaining by
suggesting that a developer has an obligation to "in-
ternalize the externalities" of his project, and that
this sort of internalization can be translated into
dollars paid to the city.
In the 70s, dollars became critically important to
both suburbs and cities. When the dull and gray
municipal bond market was suddenly thrown into
convulsions, municipalities had to search for innova-
tive ways to finance capital improvements. 23 In Cali-
fornia, a single event— the passage of 1978's Proposi-
tion 13, which drastically cut property taxes — had
a dramatic effect on cities' attitudes toward new
development by simultaneously cutting their main
sources of revenue and virtually eliminating the tax
benefits of new growth. 24 Thus, many communities
began to expand the definition of "rational nexus"
in an effort to get as much as they could out of a
new development— the only potential source of ex-
panded revenue they could see. 25
And, by the late '70s, they were willing to bargain
to get what they wanted. The federal Urban Devel-
opment Action Grant cast cities in the role of entre-
preneurs by rewarding aggressive municipalities for
their attempts to capture private development. As
the housing market grew competitive, local govern-
ments actually went into the development business
to make sure housing was built. 26 Others became
brokers who went beyond merely trying to attract
growth. They aggressively sought development of
the right type and in the right place. 27
Thus, cities were becoming "civic entrepreneurs"—
dealmakers accustomed to sitting down at the table
with private businessmen and hammering things
out.
The Will to Bargain: Developers
Once citizen groups and communities saw the eco-
nomic, social, and fiscal costs of growth and began
trying to deal with it, the cost of development sky-
rocketed — in terms of both time and money.
Impact fees had reached the point at which, at
least according to Hagman, they almost constituted
a buy-in fee. 28 The environmental impact process
was costing developers time and money even when
it went smoothly. It gave citizen groups the power
to challenge a project in court, sometimes on techni-
calities—a process which was bound to cost the
developer far more time and far more money even
if the challenge had no merit at all.
Furthermore, the passage of environmental laws
created a host of government agencies, such as the
federal Environmental Protection Agency and its
state counterparts, with single-issue agendas. To
developers used to working out a mutually accept-
able project with a local general-purpose govern-
ment, dealing with these agencies was a rude shock.
Nowhere did developers find a more frustrating
series of events than in California, where growth
had traditionally been encouraged. One environ-
mental agency, the California Coastal Commission,
had remarkable discretionary authority, and used
it to force developers to deal with the external effects
of development by mitigating or paying for them.
The coastal commission, brought into being through
a ballot initiative, sometimes required residential
builders to include low-income housing in their
beachfront developments; forced almost all land-
owners to provide public access to the coast in ex-
change for the smallest permit approvals; and in one
case even required a shopping center developer to
implement a series of transit improvements. 29
Furthermore, some prominent California devel-
opers who tried to assert a vested rights claim over
new approaches
cost to developers
talenvironmenta awareness
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use of the courts
modeled on labor disputes
the coastal legislation "suffered a series of crushing
rejections" from the courts. 30
And after a time in California, as the cost of hous-
ing became the dominant local issue in the late 70s,
even "general purpose" local governments began
adopting the Coastal Commission's "inclusionary
housing" demands, with varying degrees of success. 31
Facing a high-cost environmental impact process,
citizen groups that could tie their projects up in court
indefinitely, hostile single-purpose agencies, and
once-friendly local governments trying to extract as
much from them as possible, developers were more
than willing to bargain for development approvals
just to keep their projects going forward.
Bargaining Begins: Environmental Disputes
Bargaining came first to environmental disputes.
These disputes usually involved large projects such
as power plants or oil refineries, and federal and
state laws had given environmental groups tremen-
dous power to impede or stop them. In addition,
because of the project-specific nature of the legal
process, environmental disputes lent themselves
more easily to bargaining than land-use disputes did,
and some industrial and utility executives seemed
more willing to sit at the table, at least at first, than
real estate developers.
In some cases, governmental bodies — mostly be-
yond the local level — tried to head off confrontation
by creating a process that would bring developers
in and talk about the chances of their project in ad-
vance. As early as 1973, New Jersey environmental
officials set up the "preapplication conference" proce-
dure, encouraging coastal developers to discuss their
project's chances with regulators even before they
apply for a permit. 32
In many instances, however the parties to an envi-
ronmental dispute tried to set up a mediation process,
often modeled after mediation in labor disputes. These
environmental mediations met with varying degrees
of success.
In New York, for example, the longstanding con-
flicts over a number of projects on the Hudson River
were brought together and successfully mediated by
former EPA Administrator Russell Train — but Train
bowed out immediately after mediation, and the
agreement was difficult to implement without him.
In Maine, a dispute over a small-scale hydroelectric
plant was resolved when the parties agreed to mini-
mum and maximum lake levels, conditions that were
incorporated into the plant's federal license. An argu-
ment over how to extend Interstate 90 across a lake
into Seattle was extensively mediated, but environ-
mentalists were dissatisfied with the outcome and
subsequently sued. 33
Mediation in this context turned out to be far
more difficult than mediation in labor disputes,
which involve only two parties and limited issues. 34
And environmental mediation is not necessarily a
way to circumvent legal action. Because any party
may still file a lawsuit after the mediation, chances
for success are usually highest when then parties'
legal options have already been played out. 35
Nonetheless, mediation in environmental disputes
did prove that multi-party negotiation over land use
and development was possible and sometimes suc-
cessful, and several groups sprang up that special-
ized in mediating environmental issues.
Bargaining Goes Urban
In the cities, however, bargaining to resolve devel-
opment disputes met with more resistance. Though
negotiation and bargaining over urban land uses is
common in some other countries such as Japan
(where a developer might show up at a neighbor's
door with a gift), 36 in the U.S. there were consider-
able legal impediments to it, springing from the rigid
land use laws developed earlier in this century.
Nonetheless, beginning in the 70s, bargaining came
to urban areas — often in deals directly between citi-
zens and developers (with the municipality only
peripherally involved) and often with an environ-
mental basis.
An early example of successful development bar-
gaining in a built-up area came in the case of the
White Flint Mall near Washington, DC. Previous
attempts to build a shopping center in the area had
been fruitless, and a zone change was required. The
developer hired planning consultant Malcolm Riv-
kin to negotiate with the neighborhood group and
try to work out "a development scheme acceptable
to the residents yet economically feasible for the pro-
ponents."37 Working together, the two sides drew up
a special agreement, enforceable in court, that speci-
fied a number of details including a guarantee by
the developer of an appraised market value on each
home in the neighborhood. 38
Soon enough, however, the Alinsky-style neigh-
borhood activists — who did not necessarily think
in environmental terms — saw that they too could
bargain with developers and get something out of it.
In San Francisco, where housing is in short supply
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but the office market has been booming, housing
activists persuaded the city to adopt an informal city
policy requiring office developers to provide or pay
for housing. 39
In that same city, as federal housing subsidy funds
dried up in 1981, poverty workers in the low-income
Tenderloin district managed to strike a deal with
high-rise hotel developers to subsidize low-cost
single resident occupancy hotels; in this case, how-
ever, the city's UDAG was used as the carrot. 40 Gen-
erally, developers grumbled but were willing to do
it to take advantage of hot markets.
More formal bargaining procedures in urban situ-
ations were hampered somewhat by the inflexibility
of land-use laws. A deal struck between a developer
and neighborhood residents was more or less private,
of course, but any sort of official deal with the city
always opened up the question of contract zoning
and even the still-unsettled legal question of impact
fees.
such devices as inclusionary housing, redevelopment
areas, and density bonuses.'12 One such authoriza-
tion was California's development agreement legisla-
tion. This law, authorizing local governments and
developers to enter into binding agreements on the
conditions of development, grew, ironically, out of
the California Coastal Commission's refusal to grant
vested rights to a large developer which had ex-
pended some $3 million on site grading but had not
obtained a building permit when the coastal initia-
tive passed in 1972. Development agreements,
strongly supported in the state Legislature by the
development lobby, were intended to protect the
vested rights of developers against future changes
in land-use laws. 43
Development agreements, which are enacted into
ordinance by local governments, have not been
widely used in California. But in Santa Monica a
liberal city government used the development agree-
ment process to require developers with fairly good,
effect of land use laws
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In time, however, states began to allow more bar-
gaining. Early in the 70s, Virginia, though tradi-
tionally hostile to land-use reform, passed a law
allowing contract zoning and fast-growing Fairfax
County, near Washington, DC, used the law to
make considerable demands on developers in ex-
change for permission to develop. By 1978, the Gen-
eral Assembly had amended Virginia's zoning law
to allow for conditional zoning statewide. The "prof-
fer" system, as it is now called, has become a routin-
ized form of the zoning approval process in the
state. 41
In California, a number of state laws authorized
local governments to bargain with developers, using
but by no means airtight, vested rights claims to
make concessions to the city in exchange for per-
mission to build in the face of a moratorium.
Beyond Bargaining
Bargaining, while providing flexibility that a rigid
set of land-use rules cannot, is still a process rife with
problems. Legal problems still exist. Negotiations
among many parties — some unrepresented or even
unborn — are complicated. And bargaining takes
time. In Santa Monica, for example, the develop-
ment agreement process became so time consuming
that city officials discouraged developers from ap-
plying for them. 44
time-consuming process
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a government of deals
Because, in many instances, city, developer, and
citizen group have come to be recognized as equals
in the development process, there have been at-
tempts to move beyond bargaining and back to rigid
programs — only with vastly different ground rules.
Some cities have used the ad hoc bargaining pro-
cess as a springboard to programmatic change. In
San Francisco, the office-housing connection was
passed into ordinance by the San Francisco Board
of Supervisors. Under the program, downtown of-
fice developers pay $13.34 per square foot in fees
for housing, transit, day care, and the arts. 45 In 1983,
Boston adopted a "linkage" program, similar to San
Francisco's office-housing program, that required
downtown office developers to pay $5 per square
foot over a 12-year period into a housing trust
fund. 46
Even Santa Monica adopted firm rules. After three
years of negotiating with developers, the city council
adopted a General Plan in 1984 requiring office de-
velopers to build housing and parks or pay an in-
lieu fee of $2.25 per square foot for the first 15,000
square feet and $5 per square foot thereafter. 47
And other cities have tried innovative land-use
programs that try to get away from zoning. Ft. Col-
lins, Colo., for example, uses a kind of "performance
zoning" that does away with site-specific zoning,
and, in addition, the city agreed with the local build-
ers association on a set of mutually agreeable devel-
opment fees. 48
Such programmatic attempts, however, once
again raise the question of rigidity. Will they be flex-
ible enough to accommodate the differences in each
piece of land, each development deal? Will they re-
turn us to an era of zoning-type inflexibility? Or,
if they are general guidelines rather than specific
"end state" plans, will they merely lead to more
negotiation?
But there is a deeper question about negotiated
development — one involving fairness. Take, for ex-
ample, our attempts to "internalize the externalities,"
which lie at the heart of many of these negotiations.
Are our methods good enough so that we can iden-
tify what all the externalities are and who they af-
fect? Or will the only externalities identified be those
affecting organized interests participating in the
discussion?
Perhaps that is the most troubling question. Does
negotiated development connote the very problem
Walter Blucher warned us against thirty years ago —
a government of deals, not laws? The outcome of
negotiated development depends almost entirely on
who the negotiators are. If one neighborhood is
organized and another, also affected by the develop-
ment, is not, it is likely that the second neighbor-
hood will be left out of the final deal.
How, then, can we maintain the useful flexibility
of bargaining in land use and development without
degenerating into a free-for-all without rules? As ex-
periments with bargaining — and with more flexible
land-use programs — continue, that is the question
we must seek to answer.
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